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Abstract  
 
With increasing globalization, transnational crime in general, and human trafficking in 
particular, a design of new legal framework is required in order to effectively operationalize 
interstate law enforcement operations and prosecutions. The development of a 
transnational criminal legal framework—or frameworks—can build on pre-existing 
transnational economic frameworks. There is also the need to extend the application of 
domestic law beyond national borders to influence transnational corporate behavior. 
Regulations based on reflexive law are one possible approach. Teubner’s idea of reflexive 
law has been informing developments in this area. This approach uses traditional national 
law to inform corporate governance strategies in order to achieve effects on the market. A 
few jurisdictions have already adopted measures modeled on this approach to tackle human 
trafficking and slavery-like conditions in global supply chains. Weaknesses in the approaches 
adopted by the UK and the State of California have already been identified. If strengthened, 
this approach could be adopted in more jurisdictions—including the EU—and also to combat 
more areas of transnational crime—such as money laundering. This paper will examine the 
resulting challenges using human trafficking as a case study.   
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A. Introduction 
 
Trafficking of Human Beings (THB) is a core business of international criminal organizations. 
It is seen as a relatively low-risk/high-reward crime. At a global level, human trafficking is 
prohibited by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime published in 2000,1 and more recently by EU Directive 2011/36/EU,2 for the 
EU member states. THB does not involve “voluntary” prostitution—as understood by the 
law enforcement community—and can arise in circumstances similar to, but as a crime, is 
separate from traditional slavery, human smuggling, or poor working conditions. It builds on 
pre-existing and pre-defined crimes of slavery, servitude, forced labor, and compulsory 
labor. In the context of this paper it also involves the production of products—more so 
goods, rather than services—for global supply chains using harsh and degrading working 
conditions—including bonded labor. Transnational corporations are responsible for the 
procurement, manufacturing, and delivery of a very large percentage of the commodities in 
our domestic markets. While national laws address criminal law and labor conditions within 
our own jurisdictions, they have little effect in governing behavior outside their relevant 
jurisdiction.  
 
With increasing globalization, the issue of “the application of domestic law to international 
actors” arises.3 In the case of both transnational criminal law and transnational commercial 
law “the power of command-and-control regulation largely stops at the border.”4 The 
international business world bisects the world of cross border criminal law in a number of 
key areas. This paper will examine the resulting theoretical challenges using human 
trafficking as a case study. Two key points of intersection between the commercial and 
criminal world are: Human trafficking—and related slavery conditions—in global supply 
chains, now addressed in a number of jurisdictions, including the UK; and combating the 
laundering of proceeds of human trafficking, which is currently a global effort. The focus of 
this paper will be on the efforts of EU states to combat these two issues, and the need for 
EU measures to have extraterritorial effect, given the nature of global supply chains. 
Measures to combat money laundering through the financial and banking sector generally 
are more developed than the more recently recognized phenomenon of human trafficking 
                                            
1 See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature Nov. 
15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
2 See Directive 2011/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on Preventing and Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims, and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, 
2011 O.J. (L 101) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Council Directive 2011/36]. 
3 Bradley Girard, Corporate Transparency Through the SEC as an Antidote to Substandard Working Conditions in the 
Global Supply Chain, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 317, 321 (2014). 
4 Id. at 322.  
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in global supply chains. While measures taken to combat money laundering could be further 
developed, those measures already taken to date are likely to inform how human trafficking 
and slavery like conditions can be tackled in global supply chains.  
 
Reflexive law is an attempt by jurisdictions to make transnational businesses link to those 
jurisdictions in order to structure and manage their transnational businesses in a way that 
complies with the laws and norms of the legislating jurisdiction. The design of UK law in its 
response to its requirement to implement Directive 2011/36/EU,5 reflecting the idea of 
Teubner’s reflexive law, to address both human trafficking in global supply chains, allied to 
a similar response being adopted by anti-money laundering regimes, would together provide 
additional mechanisms, if adopted more widely, —working with the global business and 
banking communities, —to combat this form of organized crime. Reflexive law shows 
promise, particularly in extending the reach of the command and control state into the areas 
where the transnational criminal world bisects the transnational commercial and banking 
world. Reflexive law has been adopted in a number of measures, which will be discussed 
below. Concrete evidence of reflexive law’s effectiveness still needs to be measured, and it 
is arguable that those measures already adopted will need to be made more robust in order 
to ensure that effectiveness. This paper will critically analyze the potential for adopting and 
further developing reflexive law mechanisms to combat the transnational crime of human 
trafficking, and its connection to anti-money laundering issues.  
 
Human trafficking—while it can occur within one state—is more often encountered across 
a number of jurisdictions, these being countries of origin, transit, and destination. The same 
can be said about corporate global supply chains. An individual jurisdiction’s laws, or those 
of the EU, will not address—either directly or indirectly—behaviors or crimes that occur in 
third states. There is a need to develop extraterritorial effect for state or EU laws. As stated 
by Girard, “the power of command-and-control regulation largely stops at the border.”6 
Corporations, or financial systems which are based, or operate, in European or EU 
jurisdictions, are required to meet the laws of the jurisdictions in which they are based or 
operate. Reflexive law is an imperfect tool, but it is currently being adopted by both the UK 
and the EU in order to gain some extraterritorial effect for their internal standards and 
laws—particularly where transnational crime concerns bisect the realm of private 
commercial operators.  
 
This paper will start with an examination of reflexive law, building on Teubner’s original 
concept. It will then go on to examine the relevance of reflexive law to the challenges of 
human trafficking in global supply chains. Three pieces of legislation from three different 
jurisdictions, the EU, the US State of California, and the UK are examined here. The EU’s 
                                            
5 See Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, § 54 (Eng.). 
6 Girard, supra note 3, at 322. 
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Directive 2014/95/EU on the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information7 comes 
close to but does not expressly cover the issue of human trafficking in global supply chains. 
Its approach—modeled on reflexive law—is very similar to those adopted by the UK in 
Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The UK’s approach to human trafficking in global 
supply chains has also been heavily influenced by the State of California’s Transparency in 
the Supply Chains Act of 2010,8 with California having been a first mover on this issue. Much 
can be learned, not only from earlier adopters of provisions modeled on reflexive law in 
global supply chains, but also from evaluation of the adoption of laws modeled on reflexive 
law in other areas of practice such as social and environmental law. With some jurisdictions 
having adopted a reflexive law approach to tackling human trafficking and slavery in global 
supply chains—and the possibility of this approach being adopted in further jurisdictions—
there is then the issue of making the reflexive law approach to regulation actually work. This 
issue is examined later on in the article and is followed by an examination of trafficking as a 
test case for reflexive law. 
 
B. Reflexive Law  
 
Teubner’s concept of reflexive law is a development of earlier responsive law theories. It 
relies on the “fusion of public and private governance regimes.”9 The underlying premise is 
that law is supposed to “provide congruent generalizations of the expectations for the whole 
of society.”10 In addition to the traditional “‘vertical’ subordination of citizens to their 
sovereigns,” there is a need for “‘horizontal’ relations between equally situated market 
actors”11 in public-private governance regimes. These horizontal relations become relevant 
in the context of globalization.  
 
Reflexive law recognizes “the limits of regulatory law”12—limits, which we recognize in the 
context of globalization. Reflexive law originates “from a social theoretical perspective 
                                            
7 See Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 Amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and 
Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1 (EU) [hereinafter Council Directive 2014/95]. 
8 See Transparency in the Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1743.43 (2012) [hereinafter Californian Act]. 
9 Agnieszka Janczuk-Gorywoda, Public-Private Hybrid Governance for Electronic Payments in the European Union, 
13 GERMAN L.J. 1438, 1439 (2012). 
10 Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239, 273 (1983). 
11 Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 2, 3 (2002). 
12 Olivier De Schutter & Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation, General 
Introduction, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MARKET FORCES; IS THE OPEN COORDINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES THE 
FUTURE OF SOCIAL EUROPE?, 7 (Olivier De Schutter & Simon Deakin eds., 2005). 
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rather than a strictly legal one,”13 recognizing the “complexity of social life and the diversity 
of the many institutions created to achieve various ends,” and aims “to guide rather than to 
suppress” that complexity.14 Given the levels of complexity that are to be regulated by 
reflexive law, legislators need to constantly reflect on its effect and adjust accordingly: 
Having created a “disclosure based system” traditional enforcement is then reserved as a 
back-up to that system.15 
 
In designing “horizontal” relations, which can extend outside the territorial boundary of the 
state, reflexive law “seeks to design self-regulating social systems through norms of 
organization and procedure.”16 In this way “semi-autonomous social systems” are not only 
reshaped, but so also are their “methods of coordination with other social systems.”17 This 
type of law therefore is “characterized by particularism, result-orientation, an 
instrumentalist social policy approach, and the increasing legalization of formerly 
autonomous social processes.”18 As Teubner has said, “reflexive rationality in law obeys a 
logic of procedural legitimation,”19 thereby having “institutional legal characteristics quite 
different from its substantive counterpart.”20   
 
The drive to develop the concept of reflexive law arose from the understanding that “judicial 
control and state regulation of associated behavior seem to [have reached] the limits of their 
control capacity.”21 This is particularly true in the context of globalization—in both 
transnational economic law and effectively addressing transnational security—and law 
enforcement threats. The strategy is to have large, multi-national companies and global 
supply chains “substitute for outside interventionist control,” something which is highly 
problematic in the transnational sphere, for the development of “effective internal control 
structure[s].”22 This would be regulated when the large multi-national company—or key 
parts of the global supply chain—bisect one or more key state jurisdictions, those 
jurisdictions being sites of reflexive law regulation. As stated by Shaffer, “in a globalized 
                                            
13 Eric W. Orts, A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q.779, 780 (1995). 
14 Id. at 780. 
15 Id. at 787. 
16 Teubner, supra note 10, at 254–55. 
17 Id. at 255. 
18 Id. at 267. 
19 Id. at 270. 
20 Id. at 256. 
21 Id. at 278. 
22 Id. 
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world, much of law is subject to transnational influences and pressures, but more powerful 
states are the primary exporters of legal norms.”23 The larger economies of the US, the EU, 
and the UK would be key players in influencing global commercial entities. In this way most—
if not all—of the large multi-national companies or global supply chains would become 
subject to the provisions of reflexive law regulation, thereby either facilitating better 
transnational commercial effectiveness—something that is of direct interest to the 
commercial world—while effectively contributing to the minimization of global security and 
law enforcement threats. This should also be of interest to responsible business. 
 
Therefore—as stated by Teubner—“law’s role is to decide about decisions, regulate 
regulations, and establish structural premises for future decisions, in terms of organization, 
procedure and competencies.”24 Law’s role in one subsystem should have specific outcomes 
in other related or parallel subsystems. Law therefore “attempts to balance bargaining 
power, but this only indirectly controls specific results,”25 and has been shown by different 
researchers to have had variable success in different areas of business and law.26 Of 
relevance to this point is who has or should have the necessary bargaining power. The 
effectiveness of reflexive law measures also need to be subjected to “strong empirical 
testing” before they can be claimed to be truly effective. As Teubner himself points out, “the 
‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’ is almost inevitable.”27 
 
C. The Relevance of Reflexive Law to Human Trafficking in Global Supply Chains 
 
Globalization is not just affecting the economic sphere of activities. As is becoming obvious 
to more and more people in their ordinary lives, globalization is also bringing with it new 
security threats. There is a need to develop a transnational criminal law framework to 
address issues that range from worldwide cyber threats to international terrorism 
movements. One particular crime that needs a transnational approach is THB, which was 
one of the earliest crimes that the EU addressed, in 1997.28 The vast majority of THB cases 
are connected with organized crime, as by the nature of movement, control, and 
exploitation of individuals requires a number of people to be involved. This is evidenced by 
the fact that the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
                                            
23 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 231 (2011). 
24 Teubner, supra note 10, at 275. 
25 Id. at 276. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Joint Action 97/154, of 24 February 1997 Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union Concerning Action to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Exploitation of Children, 
1997 O.J. (L 63) 2 (EU).  
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Especially Women and Children is attached to the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime 2000. The predominant motivational factor for THB is money. This poses a 
challenge for both law enforcement and financial services generally. The challenges arising 
from the crime of THB are multifaceted. An area for development—and the focus of this 
paper—could be on those issues which are of relevance to law enforcement, but are more 
closely related to the commercial world. This paper addresses the potential for development 
of this transnational commercial-crime nexus, using one of the tools used by transnational 
economic law to date, reflexive law.  
 
The line of reasoning that reflects the idea of reflexive law has recently been adopted to 
address the issue of THB in global supply chains. In an effort to address the behavior of 
business operating global supply chains—and reflecting the limitations of the command and 
control approach of domestic jurisdictions—a new way of conceptualizing law needs to be 
developed. Both international trade and transnational crime bridge jurisdictions. There is a 
need to develop legal frameworks which occupy the space between national jurisdictions, 
and which addresses issues which arise when there are gaps or weaknesses in one of the 
interconnected jurisdictions relevant to both criminal and commercial global supply chains. 
One way would be to develop inter-jurisdictional legal frameworks under the umbrella of 
the UN Convention on Transnational Crime 2000. Another is to develop the extraterritorial 
effect of domestic jurisdictions. One of the tools being used by domestic jurisdictions is to 
enact provisions to require international business—with a substantial connection with that 
jurisdiction—to manage their businesses in ways which meet the laws and norms of that 
particular jurisdiction. These are therefore laws which require internal corporate processes 
to be implemented as part of the company’s corporate governance framework.  
 
While provisions based on reflexive law have yet to be adopted by the EU to directly address 
THB—or security provisions in general—the approach is not unknown to the EU. The 
reflexive law approach has already been adopted within the EU legal framework, and it is 
the argument of this paper that the EU would benefit from provisions similar to those 
adopted by the US State of California, or those in the UK, to combat trafficking in human 
beings in global supply chains. Similar provisions have already been written into the EU legal 
framework through Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards to disclosure of non-financial 
and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups.29 Directive 2014/95/EU 
applies to “[l]arge undertakings which are public-interest entities exceeding on their balance 
sheet dates the criterion of the average number of 500 employees during the financial 
                                            
29 See Directive 2013/34, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual Financial 
Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC 
and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19 (EU) [hereinafter Council Directive 2013/34]. 
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year.”30 Directive 2013/34/EU31 defines public-interest entities as “companies governed by 
the laws of a member state,” and are so designated by member states as having “significant 
public relevance because of the nature of their business, their size or the number of their 
employees.”32 The obligation is to make a non-financial statement. This statement needs to 
cover “the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development, 
performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to as a minimum environmental, 
social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery 
matters.”33  
 
Packaged as part of corporate social responsibility, rather than as an effort to combat—inter 
alia—human trafficking, this EU provision was enacted in order to facilitate the “disclosure 
of non-financial information” in order to assist in “the measuring, monitoring and managing 
of undertakings' performance and their impact on society,”34 with an eye specifically on 
social, to include corruption, and environmental issues. The intention behind the reporting 
mechanism—and its audit—is to require businesses to seriously take into consideration set 
EU and national environmental and social objectives. In giving proper consideration to these 
objectives, businesses are expected to modify their decision-making processes, thereby 
reorienting the entirety of their operations in order that the business aims to achieve 
outcomes which are more in line with objectives set in other EU laws and policy documents. 
The resulting fusion of public law—the directive—with an anticipated refocusing of internal 
corporate governance strategies, should lead to a change of behavior of a large number of 
the dominant players on the market. This should then have a knock-on effect of changing 
the market as a whole, with many larger companies requiring their suppliers to operate to 
the same high standards, in order to maintain transnational supply chain integrity.  
 
Directive 2014/95/EU was to be implemented in EU member states by December 06, 2016, 
with a view to applying to financial years either starting on January 01, 2017, or during the 
2017 calendar year, depending on business practice in the EU. The effectiveness of these 
provisions modeled on reflexive law therefore still have to be evaluated. A weakness in this 
provision—in the context of this paper—is that it does not expressly address the issue of 
THB, something which has been addressed in other jurisdictions, initially in the US State of 
California, and more recently in the UK. In addition, there is no corresponding provision 
elsewhere in the EU Area of Freedom Security and Justice legal framework. Little 
amendment would be required of Directive 2014/95/EU in order to address the issue of THB. 
                                            
30 Council Directive 2014/95, supra note 7, at art. 1.  
31 Council Directive 2013/34, supra note 29. 
32 Id. at art. 2. 
33 Council Directive 2014/95, supra note 7, at art.1 (inserting a new art. 19(a) to Directive 2013/34). 
34 Id. at para. 3. 
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Nevertheless, any such amendment might be informed by the drafting of both the 
Californian and UK provisions, and post-enactment evaluation of effectiveness. In addition, 
a reflexive law approach to tackling money laundering within the EU legal framework would 
also be useful. The EU’s approach to legislative drafting in Directive 2014/95/EU already has 
some similarity with the UK provision on human trafficking in global supply chains, as 
pointed out in the UK Home Office guide to Transparency in Supply Chains.35  
 
The lead jurisdiction on tackling human trafficking in global supply chains is the US State of 
California. There, the crime of human trafficking at the US federal level is addressed by the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, as amended, which, inter alia, 
amended the U.S. Code to cover this crime.36 This is supplemented by the State of California 
through the Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010—the Californian Act—which came into 
effect in 2012.37 The Californian Act required every retail seller and manufacturer doing 
business in this state—as defined by Californian tax law—and with annual worldwide gross 
receipts exceeding US $100 million to meet certain disclosure requirements.38 These 
disclosure requirements are for the purposes of informing, at a minimum, other businesses, 
the authorities, and consumers the extent that the “retail seller or manufacturer” verifies 
the integrity of its supply chain to be free from human trafficking and slavery, and conducts 
audits of suppliers, with the requirement to state if the “verification was not an 
independent, unannounced audit.”39 In addition, all materials from suppliers incorporated 
into their own products must be similarly certified.40 Further, internal corporate governance 
structures must include “internal accountability standards and procedures for employees or 
contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking.”41 In 
addition, employees, and management responsible for ensuring that supply chains do not 
include products of human trafficking or slavery, must be given appropriate training.42  
 
The focus of the Californian Act is on disclosure and informing the consumer and other 
interested parties. The intention is that greater transparency will lead to peer and public 
pressure to adjust behavior. There is no requirement in the Californian Act to actually adjust 
                                            
35 See HOME OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE, 2015, at 26 (Eng.). 
36 See generally 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2018), e.g. inserting, inter alia, new arts. 1589–1591. 
37 ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, LEVERAGING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIMES TO COMBAT 
TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 26 (2014). 
38 Californian Act at § 3. 
39 Id. at §§ 3(a)(1) & 2. 
40 See id. at § 3(3). 
41 Id. at § 3(a)(4). 
42 See id. at § 3(a)(5). 
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corporate behavior to ensure that the supply chain is actually free of products produced by 
human trafficking or slavery victims. Nonetheless, the reflexive law element would arise for 
companies which do wish to comply with the higher standards and want to be seen to be 
delivering human trafficking and slavery free products to the market. At the time of the 
enactment of the Californian Act it was “expected to apply to approximately 3,200 global 
companies.”43 It introduced novel features, which have been built on by the UK in its Modern 
Slavery Act 2015.  
 
While the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is primarily focused on the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales, its transparency in supply chains provisions,44 with regard to slavery and human 
trafficking, applies to the whole of the UK. Whether the UK global supply chains provisions 
are or will be effective in achieving their stated objectives is a matter that requires further 
examination. Section 54 applies to commercial organizations which supply goods or services 
and have a total turnover45 as specified by regulation made by the Secretary of State, 
currently at STG £36 million.46 
 
Neither the above-mentioned UK, nor the EU initiatives in the area of human rights reporting 
by businesses operate in a vacuum, with both the UN47 and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)48 having similar provisions in their relevant policy 
documents. Human trafficking is addressed by three different pieces of legislation in the UK, 
reflecting the fact that this issue is predominantly a matter for the devolved governments in 
both Scotland and Northern Ireland. The England and Wales legislation—the Modern Slavery 
Act 201549—provides for two distinct crimes: Section 1 offense of “slavery, servitude and 
forced or compulsory labour,” which arguably in itself could be viewed as four different but 
overlapping crimes, and the Section 2 offense of “human trafficking.” The Scottish and 
Northern Irish legislations50 take a similar approach. The breadth of definitions used would 
                                            
43 Jonathan Todres, The Private Sector’s Pivotal Role in Combating Human Trafficking, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 80, 81 (2012). 
44 Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 54 (which came into force on October 29, 2015, pursuant to the Modern Slavery Act 
2015 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional Provision) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1816 (Eng.)). 
45 See Modern Slavery Act 2015 at § 54(3). 
46 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1833, § 2 (Eng.). 
47 See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (2011). 
48 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT MATTERS (2014). 
49 A number of provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 apply to the whole of the UK, to include the Section 54 
provision on human trafficking in global supply chains. See Modern Slavery Act 2015 at § 54. 
50 See generally Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015, (ASP 12); see also The Human Trafficking 
and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 c. 2. 
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cover abusive situations that would not fall within the definitions of human trafficking used 
in UN, Council of Europe, or EU texts. This difference in approach may have an effect on 
addressing this type of exploitation in an otherwise legitimate businesses global supply 
chain. 
 
Another point where ostensibly legitimate business bisects THB, is in the context of money 
laundering of criminal proceeds. At least some of the funds associated with THB are being 
handled by reputable financial and business entities in Western Europe.51 Financial 
institutions and money transfer services have been key in all THB case studies published to 
date in “moving the proceeds and instrumentalities of THB.” The Organization for Security 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has advocated the full leverage of “the private sector’s access 
to the financial transactions of criminals,” in order for countries to be more effective in 
tackling this crime.52 There is, therefore, scope for the further development of reflexive law 
mechanisms in this area.  
 
There have been, at least to date, a very low number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) 
identifying either human trafficking or its related crime, human smuggling.53 As the OSCE 
has stated, while THB is “in many respects a unique crime,” its associated money laundering 
processes are “identical to those used for other types of crime.”54 This has been echoed in 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report on the topic,55 which points out that “there is 
no specific guidance on money laundering associated with THB[/ smuggling of migrants],” as 
“the instruments and the sectors implied are the same as for other criminal activities.” The 
OSCE has pointed out that THB related financial transactions have often been carried out 
through money or value transfer services—in particular money transmitters and cash 
couriers—which face little supervision and monitoring in most countries.56 For example, 
Guzman, reporting on a US/Canadian case, pointed out the use of prepaid cards to move 
funds across borders.57 The traditional banking system has also been used effectively to 
move traffickers’ monies. Harnessing the financial—and related sectors—abilities and 
                                            
51 LEVERAGING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIMES, supra note 37, at 14. 
52 Id. at 9. 
53 Susan Grossey, I am not a number, I am a free man, MONEY LAUNDERING BULLETIN 15 (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.airant.it/system/files/MLB%20Sept%202011.pdf.  
54 LEVERAGING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIMES, supra note 37, at 9. 
55 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING RISKS ARISING FROM TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS AND SMUGGLING OF 
MIGRANTS 63 (2011). 
56 LEVERAGING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGIMES, supra note 37, at 18. 
57 See Daniela Guzman, How Financial Institutions Lead Way in Battle Against Human Trafficking, INSIGHT CRIME, 
(May 6, 2014), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-financial-institutions-lead-way-in-battle-against-
human-trafficking/.  
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knowledge of their own business’s practices to combat transnational THB would be a step 
forward. 
 
Reliance is often made on private or commercial actors for security related services, as will 
be required in the development of reflexive law for transnational law enforcement or 
security purposes. Reflexive law attempts to address the “application of domestic law to 
international actors.”58 The approach of reflexive regulation is to set the required objective 
by way of law—which is mandatory on the legal entities operating within a particular 
jurisdiction—but leaving to the market operators to “determine the most efficient and 
effective ways to achieve [the] desired results.”59  
 
Regulating through reflexive law, therefore, can lead to many forms of state adjustment. For 
example, the shift of responsibility from the state to, in the commercial world, the market, 
will in some cases “create . . . new public-private hybrid models of governance.”60 While the 
security and law enforcement world will be less interested in the state ceding power to the 
market, nevertheless new—or at least additional—modes of governance will be required in 
order to effectively tackle transnational threats. In the absence of a global regulatory 
framework in this area, a number of new strategies will have to be developed. While the 
state will increasingly be moving from rowing to steering, the combination of “territorially 
focused as well as deterritorialized normative structures” will be leading to “increasingly 
complex forms of steering mechanisms.”61 In addition, there may be a need to engage in a 
paradigmatic shift from the traditional state-centered top-down approach of legislative 
drafting, and to adopt an approach to regulation, which also allows the development of a 
bottom-up system. In this way it should be possible to develop “regulatory mechanisms 
[created using the] cooperative efforts [of] various kinds of actors below the state level,”62 
and which operate in the global economic community. In approaching this issue there is a 
need to recognize that transnational economic law—as it has developed to date—has been 
recognized to induce “legal change [and] can have broader systemic effects within states” 
while “reconfiguring the respective roles of the state, the market, and other forms of social 
ordering.”63 
 
D. Making the Reflexive Law Approach Work  
 
                                            
58 Girard, supra note 3, at 321.  
59 Id. at 338.  
60 Shaffer, supra note 23, at 244. 
61 CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., PHILIP C. JESSUP’S TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVISITED 28 (Christian Tietje et al. eds., 2006). 
62 Id. at 29. 
63 Shaffer, supra note 23, at 243–44. 
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If the ideas underpinning reflexive law are being adopted to tackle human trafficking—and 
slavery-like practices—in corporate global supply chains, then this approach to lawmaking 
needs to actually work. As stated by Dorf, “reflexive law is a mechanism by which collective 
decisions of society as a whole steer other actors and institutions.”64 Reflexive law “is 
concerned with procedures for multi-participant law-making rather than with the resulting 
substantive norms.”65 Based on “social science systems theory and autopoiesis theory,” 
reflexive law “refers to learning and exchange of demands, expectations and best practices 
between social sub-systems.”66 Autopoiesis theory originates from biology, covering “the 
basic principles of self-reproducing and self-organising systems.”67 Reflexive law theory 
points out the “need for law to focus on regulation of self-regulation.”68 It needs, therefore, 
to be “tentative, experimental, and learning”69 in developing its steering mechanisms, and 
evaluating their effectiveness, as “certain institutional frameworks facilitate reflexivity, 
while others discourage it.”70  
 
Reflexive law requires constant self-critical review of social institutions and their 
processes.71 The legal framework is used to establish incentives and procedures which 
requires institutions to think critically, creatively, and continually about their internal 
process and methods of operating, with a view to establish their effect on external 
structures, individuals, and society at large.72 The complexity of how society—and sub-sets 
of society—operate precludes the legal framework from directly specifying how internal 
corporate procedures and processes are to be managed, merely stating that they have to be 
managed. While reflexive law, it is acknowledged, “cannot and should not replace 
command-and-control regulation in all domains,”73 it is argued that modern society and—in 
                                            
64 Michael Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 398 (2003).  
65 Karin Buhmann, Reflexive Regulation of CSR to Promote Sustainability: Understanding EU Public-Private 
Regulation on CSR Through the Case of Human Rights, 8 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L.J. 38, 55 (2010). 
66 Id. at 16. 
67 RALF ROGOWSKI, REFLEXIVE LABOR LAW IN THE WORLD SOCIETY, 63 (2013). 
68 Id. at 38. 
69 Peer Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 
AM. J. OF COMP. L. 769, 794 (2008). 
70 De Schutter & Deakin, supra note 12, at 4. 
71 Orts, supra note 13, at 780. 
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73 Dorf, supra note 64, at 398. 
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the context of this paper—the businesses that operate in modern society are “so complex 
and fractured that command-and-control regulation is bound to fail.”74  
 
The reflexive law approach can be considered successful if it proves its capacity, in a 
particular context, “to engender responses of a certain kind within the relevant 
sub-systems.”75 In order to engender these responses, it may be necessary to use 
“combinations of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law in varying degrees.”76 As pointed out by Deakin and 
McLaughlin, “a reflexive approach does not imply the absence of ‘hard law.’”77 Rather, they 
say, “the legal framework has a number of roles to play: Inducing efficient disclosure, setting 
default rules and encouraging bargaining in the shadow of the law.”78 These roles are set for 
reflexive law through the use of “both public and private law, official and unofficial” allied 
with “soft and hard norms.”79 Default conditions need therefore to be set, which will “apply 
in the absence of agreement between social actors,”80 “legitimating the collective actors 
concerned,” and “mandating disclosure of information needed for meaningful 
negotiation.”81 The mechanisms, by which this legal framework will operate, need to be 
“identified, and once identified, must be affirmatively created.”82 As pointed out by Deakin 
and McLaughlin, there is also a need for “bridging institutions” beyond the legal and 
enforcement framework “in which effective deliberation and participatory decision-making 
can occur.”83 In the context of engagement with the corporate world, the 
“managerialization” of law is also key, whereby in-house corporate lawyers gain leverage 
over their internal governance structures, and can “use the threat of litigation, with the 
                                            
74 Id. at 395. 
75 Catherine Barnard et al., Reflexive Law, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Evolution of Labour Standards: 
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potential for substantial liabilities and wider reputational losses, to persuade employers” to 
alter their course.84  
 
 
E. Trafficking as a Test Case of Reflexive Law 
 
Unlike the Californian Act—which focuses only on the supply chains for goods—the UK 
legislation covers both the supply of goods and services,85 and is to cover all sectors of these 
business operations.86 In addition, the UK Home Office envisages that it is to cover 
organizations carrying out any part of their business in the UK, with no minimum level of 
presence required in the jurisdiction for this legislative provision to apply.87  
 
As referred to above, section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015,88 takes the approach of 
making a business organization publish statements on its web site setting out the “steps the 
organisation has taken during the financial year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking 
is not taking place,” “in any of its supply chains,” and “in any part of its own business.”89 The 
assumption being taken is that such statements are reliable and rely on a properly 
conducted audit. If no such steps have been taken to ensure that slavery and human 
trafficking is not taking place within the business’s global supply chain, then the organization 
must make a statement to that effect.90 If no such statement is made under Section 54 of 
the Modern Slavery Act, then the Secretary of State may bring “civil proceedings in the High 
Court for an injunction, or in Scotland, for specific performance of a statutory duty.”91 Failure 
to comply with the injunction, or order of specific performance, would be contempt of court, 
and be “punishable by an unlimited fine.”92 As stated by the Home Office, a statement to 
the effect that the undertaking has taken no such measures may damage the reputation of 
                                            
84 Id. 
85 See Modern Slavery Act 2015, § 54(2). 
86 See HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY AND SUPPLY CHAINS GOVERNMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION RESPONSES AND 
NEXT STEPS, 6 (2015) (Eng.). 
87 See id. at 6, para. 5(4). 
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which came into force on October 29, 2015). See Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) 
Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1833, § 2 (UK). 
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the business and should lead to pressure on the business from consumers, investors, and 
non-governmental organizations.93  
 
The statements need to be signed by those responsible for the business—such as company 
boards and directors or a partner of the organization—so that “those at the top level take 
this issue seriously and understand the implications of taking little or no action.”94 
Statements need to be published on the undertaking’s website, with “a link to the slavery 
and human trafficking statement in a prominent place on that website’s homepage.”95 If the 
business has no website, alternative requirements have been set out in the act.96 In addition, 
there is an obligation on senior managers to “ensure everyone in the organisation is alive to 
the risks of modern slavery.”97 The intention is to “create a race to the top by encouraging 
businesses to be transparent about what they are doing, thus increasing competition to 
drive up standards.”98  
 
Under the current UK legal framework, there is an assumption that consumers, investors, 
and non-governmental organizations have sufficient power, whether that be commercial, 
moral pressure, or under the legal framework, to be able to bring pressure to bear on the 
transnational corporations.99 This may be the case with regard to some, but not all relevant 
global supply chains.  
 
The UK legal framework has addressed the disclosure aspects of laws modeled on the 
reflexive law approach, and there are hard law requirements compelling disclosure for 
companies with sufficient turnover. What is to happen once the necessary disclosure has 
been made, or the conditions required to be put in place in the lead up to the necessary 
disclosure, is, however, left unaddressed by the legal framework. The emphasis of the 
concepts underpinning reflexive law is to guide complexity. Standard setting in the public 
domain through traditional legislation is meant to have an effect on the private domain of 
internal corporate governance structures. This effect is then supposed to spill over into 
inter-business relations on the relevant market generally, and—in the context of this 
paper—through global supply chains. This is meant to occur through focusing business 
                                            
93 See id. at 6. 
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decision-making on meeting objectives already set by states and leaving to business to 
establish how best to attain those objectives in the context of their individual commercial 
activities. Disclosure requirements are meant to be merely one step in the process of 
orientating business through corporate governance structures to achieve those objectives. 
Default rules for disclosures, which are unsatisfactory or misleading, or even disclosures of 
negative information with regard to addressing modern slavery in global supply chains, in 
the absence of sufficient external pressure, have not been addressed by the UK legislation. 
There is an assumption by the UK legislators that consumers, investors, and 
non-governmental organizations100 will have sufficient power and resources to develop 
Deakin and McLaughlin’s “bargaining in the shadow of the law.”101 In order for the UK 
legislature to better reflect the concepts underpinning reflexive law, and in order to make 
its current Section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provisions properly effective, further 
legal provisions are required. 
 
Default conditions to be applied “in the absence of agreement between social actors,”102 
and the relevant transnational corporations, are missing from the current UK legal 
framework. Criminal sanctions for non-engagement with these external stakeholders would 
also make this system more robust in light of the seriousness of the underlying crime of 
modern slavery. Also missing are bridging institutions beyond the legal and enforcement 
framework “in which effective deliberation and participatory decision-making can occur.”103  
 
Flaws also arise in the context of the UK mandated information disclosure. As pointed out 
by Girard—writing in the context of substandard employment practices in global supply 
chains—not only is the issue that information is disclosed, but also “how the corporation 
discovers the reported information.”104 Under the Californian Act there is a requirement, in 
Section 3, on corporations not only to “disclose audits of their supply chains,”105 but also to 
disclose whether those “audits were unannounced and performed by an independent 
party.”106 In addition, the Californian law requires, at Section 3(c)(3), that direct supplies 
need to certify that materials incorporated into the product comply with slavery and human 
trafficking laws. This level of detail is currently missing from the provisions in Section 53 of 
the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015. This issue is important, as, as pointed out by Narine, in 
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her paper on the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, in 
a survey on global supply chains, while 2,508 companies were surveyed, 28% had human 
rights policies, and 21% planned to implement them, only 6% claimed to actively monitor 
their global supply chains and only 7% had enforcement mechanisms.107 If all multi-national 
companies operate in essentially the same way, then similar issues will arise with the 
effectiveness of Section 53 of the UK’s Modern Slavery Act 2015. The training requirements 
in section 53.5(f) of the UK laws or “its staff” appear to be broader than section 3(c)(5) of 
the California Act’s requirements that company employees and management, who have 
direct responsibility for supply chain management, get the appropriate training.  
 
The approach being taken in the UK’s transparency in supply chains provisions are building 
on similar developments in the area of business ethics and human rights in a number of 
different forae, none of which, other than the above referred to Californian Act, specifically 
refer to human trafficking. For example, within the UK, companies are required under the 
Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013108 to report 
“to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position 
of the company’s business, include . . . information about . . . social, community and human 
rights issues . . . including information about any policies of the company in relation to those 
matters and effectiveness of those policies.”109 Failure to properly prepare a strategic report 
leads to being guilty of an offense under which an individual can be criminally fined.110 The 
Home Office is of the view that for those companies obliged to provide both the Companies 
Act 2006 strategic report covering human rights—normally quoted companies—and to 
make the disclosure requirements under the Modern Slavery Act transparency in supply 
chains provisions, could prepare a statement that would meet with both requirements. As 
stated by the act, “it is envisioned most companies will opt for two separate statements.”111 
 
While the Californian Act has been used above to identify and analyze weaknesses in the UK 
law on combatting human trafficking in global supply chains, substantial weaknesses remain 
in the US legal framework on this issue. The Californian Act does not have a direct 
counterpart at the US federal level, however, other, more limited, related provisions do 
operate. A US wide act, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010, at Section 1502, addresses the use of “any conflict minerals from the Democratic 
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Republic of Congo (DRC) in their supply chains.”112 While limited in focus, Feasley argues 
that it has “been a model for other US regulatory efforts to eliminate forced labor from 
supply chains.”113 It has also been subject to criticism. For example, Narine points out that 
transnational corporations “often do not have as much leverage with their suppliers as one 
would think.”114 In addition, she argues that the drive to keep costs down and lax laws in a 
host country could undermine supply chain transparency rules. In addition, suppliers can 
always do business with less demanding transnational corporations, with a consequent 
change in suppliers being also very costly and time-consuming for the transnational 
corporation, and can adversely affect local employees, and by extension, the local 
economy.115   
 
There is currently a proposed act before Congress, the Business Supply Chain Transparency 
on Trafficking and Slavery Act 2015—currently HR 3226—which is, at the time of writing, at 
the committee stage. Already in force at the federal level in the US is the 2012 Executive 
Order - Strengthening Protections Against Trafficking In Persons In Federal Contracts, or EO 
13627. This Executive Order covers contracts “exceeding USD 500,000 that are performed 
abroad to develop robust risk assessment and compliance plans” to combat THB in their 
supply chain.116 While seen as being broad and ambitious, the order does not extend to 
non-US government procurement contracts.117 In addition, the US has in place the Alien Tort 
Statute, which some US writers see as being relevant in this area. The Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) was initially enacted as part of the Judicature Act of 1789. While a long-standing piece 
of US legislation, it is only recently being pleaded in the context of human rights law. A recent 
case, Doe I et al. v. Nestle USA,118 before the Ninth Circuit did rule that slavery was “a 
universally prohibited customary international rights violation.”119 Nevertheless, as Feasley 
points out, “no contested corporate ATS case has resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the 
human rights abuse victims in a US federal court.”120 Concerns have been raised as to the 
levels of extraterritoriality being argued for in its application. Whether the US Alien Torts 
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Statute will have any relevance to human trafficking in supply chain cases going forward has 
yet to be established. 
 
While attempts by two jurisdictions—the UK and the early moving State of California—to 
address human trafficking and slavery in global supply chains have been addressed above to 
include the flaws and criticisms of their approach and perceived effectiveness to date, the 
EU has yet to make any attempts to legislate in this area. This is despite the fact that the EU 
was an early mover in legislating to combat human trafficking generally. The approaches 
modeled on reflexive law being taken by the UK and the State of California are not unknown 
to the EU, which has already adopted similar provisions in Directive 2014/95/EU. The EU 
should give some consideration to similarly legislating—perhaps using the concepts that 
underpin reflexive law—to combat human trafficking in global supply chains, while also 
benefiting from the experience and criticism of the earlier attempts to so legislate by the UK 
and the State of California.  
 
Lessons can also be learned, by all jurisdictions, from other policy areas where the ideas 
underpinning reflexive law have informed legislative drafting. Reflexive law based regimes 
have been operating in a number of areas of transnational business in recent years, with an 
“analysis of the efficacy” of those regimes leading “to a conclusion that the most successful 
approach is a hybrid of all of the accountability regimes,”121 requiring, in the context of 
business, “international regulation, market-based, civil-liability, and domestic regulation.”122 
In addition, there would be a need for criminal liability provisions to be in place in the context 
of modern slavery, where appropriate, and the “bridging institutions” of Deakin and 
McLaughlin, where the “effective deliberation and participatory decision-making can 
occur,”123 in order to ensure that the objectives of the reflexive laws actually operate.  
 
Commenting on the National Contact Points set up under the OECD Guidelines on 
Multinational Enterprises, Feasley stated that “as long as procedures . . . are voluntary” then 
they “cannot function as the sole mechanism” to combat forced labor in supply chains.124 
Gold, Tautrims, and Trodd state that “the traditional managerial paradigm of profit 
maximisation” requires ensuring that a company’s global supply chain is slavery free in order 
to “trade-off against the risks of litigation and reputation damage.”125 This logic requires not 
just voluntary action to combat potential reputational damage, but also potentially high risks 
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of litigation, whether that be criminal or civil. It would appear that regulation based on 
reflexive law by itself will not achieve its anticipated objectives. It needs to be backed up by 
traditional hard law. A reflexive law regulatory approach may, however, better negotiate 
complexity and extend the territorial reach of national and EU laws in ways that traditional 
hard laws cannot achieve by themselves. It is not clear that there are such high risks of 
litigation under the current UK legal framework. An effective “reflexive, negotiating 
government does keep (and does need) . . . certain teeth and claws.”126 Reliance on the 
market solely in order to achieve these objectives would be an error. As pointed out by 
Feasley, many believe that “corporate accountability for human rights” is a “disposable 
concept” when human rights promotion and corporate interests diverge.127 
 
G. Conclusion  
 
Globalization is clearly posing challenges for the regulation of both transnational and 
economic law, and for the need to address transnational criminality through transnational 
criminal law. Under traditional legal frameworks, the effectiveness of state command and 
control models stop at the border.128 There is a need to examine how states—in particular 
the larger and more economically active jurisdictions—can have an effect on the behavior 
of transnational business. Laws based on the approach of reflexive law are emerging as a 
possible additional tool for addressing these concerns. As stated above, the approach of 
“reflexive regulation” is to set the required objective by way of law—which is mandatory on 
the legal entities operating within a particular jurisdiction—but leaving to the market 
operators to “determine the most efficient and effective ways to achieve desired results.”129 
Mechanisms based on reflexive law need to be properly designed and implemented in order 
to be effective.  
 
The reflexive law approach has already been deployed in a number of areas of commercial 
activity by a number of jurisdictions. Assessments have already been made as to the 
effectiveness and weaknesses of reflexive law mechanisms in the commercial world. THB is 
one point at which the ostensibly legitimate commercial world bisects the transnational 
criminal world. Global anti-money laundering provisions and processes is a second. 
Measures have already been taken by a small number of jurisdictions to regulate for THB in 
global supply chains using reflexive law methodology. Similar measures could also be taken 
to tackle anti-money laundering. Weaknesses are already emerging in those reflexive law 
mechanisms adopted to tackle THB in global supply chains. In particular, the recently 
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enacted UK provisions, set out in section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, shows such 
weaknesses. In order to be effectively regulating by reflexive law provisions, which by its 
very nature is “tentative, experimental, and learning,”130 the law needs to be subject to 
constant self-critical review of its institutions, and their processes, as to whether and how 
they are achieving the required steering mechanism.131 It also needs to be subjected to 
strong empirical testing before its effectiveness in any particular context can be truly 
established.132 There is already a need to revisit the UK provisions to tighten them up, in 
order to make them more effective, in lights of lessons learned elsewhere.  
 
Some may argue that a weakness of all of the legal frameworks discussed above is that they 
are focused on larger multi-national companies. It is accepted by this writer that the burdens 
being imposed on companies by regulations based on reflexive law would be 
disproportionate if used against smaller companies, and smaller companies are “not likely 
to be regulated successfully by internal management systems,”133 as smaller companies are 
typically more focused on survival. These smaller operations are best influenced through the 
larger multinational companies, and their horizontal provisions, developed by the larger 
companies for their particular context, and operating under transnational reflexive law 
regulation.  
 
The use of transnational reflexive law—as opposed exclusive reliance on traditional, 
jurisdictionally based, command and control law—requires new, additional, ways of 
conceptualizing, designing, and assessing the effectiveness of law. For example, the 
“multi[i]-directional nature of transnational legal processes”134 would need to be 
acknowledged, together with their effect on “states that are strong and proximate to 
international institutions,” or the relevant regulatory authority or jurisdiction. In addition 
the effect of these initiatives would have to be examined on those states “that are weak, 
distant, and peripheral.”135 Shaffer points out that not only does the law need to change, 
but so too does the perception of the relationship between the state and the market, and 
how the state operates this type of law.136 In addition, the role of governance structures 
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within transnational corporations in achieving the objectives of the reflexive law and new 
accountability mechanisms needs to be developed.137  
 
Reliance on reputation sensitivities—where these exists—market forces, and consumer 
pressure assumes that the public at large have access to relevant information, and can 
engage in “democratic control of enterprises’ behaviour.”138 As Aalders and Wilthagen have 
pointed out, this requires “(1) systems monitoring, (2) intermediary structures and networks 
[echoed by Deakin and McLaughlin139], (3) corporate social responsibility, and (4) other 
market-oriented regulatory tools.”140 A number of these are still missing from the UK legal 
framework on THB in global supply chains. An effective “reflexive, negotiating government 
does keep (and does need) . . . certain teeth and claws.”141  
 
The State of California has made a start in the US to tackling human trafficking and slavery 
in global supply chains. Other jurisdictions in the US need to catch up. Given the level of 
seriousness that the EU attributes to the issue of human trafficking, it should also consider 
legislating for human trafficking and slavery-like practices in global supply chains. Within 
Europe, both the UK and EU legal frameworks still require further development. The issues 
raised above will need to be considered in reviewing the effectiveness of these provisions 
based on reflexive law.  
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